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Mounting a Judicial Challenge to President Barack
Obama's Recess Appointment of Richard Cordray:
The Constitutional Mandate of Standing
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1903, during consecutive sessions of the
Senate, the Senate President Pro Tern brought down the gavel to signal
1
the end of one session and the simultaneous beginning of another.
During this split-second transition, President Theodore Roosevelt made
over 160 recess appointments. 2 Although no evidence suggests that
judicial action was taken to challenge President Roosevelt's
appointments, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report indicating
fervent disapproval of the notion that the President is empowered to
make recess appointments during such a constructive recess. Until the
unprecedented decision of Canning v. NLRB,4 custom and practice
evolved over the intervening century based, at least in part, on this
Senate Judiciary Committee interpretation of the Recess Appointment
Clause.5
This Note will demonstrate that the Article III standing doctrine

1. See generally John Elwood, Comment to Recess Appointment of Richard Cordray
Despite Pro Forma Sessions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 4, 2012, 10:45 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/04/recess-appointment-of-richard-cordray-despite-proforma-sessions/ (describing the brief transition between sessions and President Roosevelt's
split-second recess appointments).
2. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 4 (2012) [hereinafter
Lawfulness Recess Appt.]; see also HENRY B. HOGUE, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS, C.R.S.REP. No. RS21308, 10 (2012) [hereinafter HOGUE].
3. See S. REP. No. 58-4389, at 2 (1905), availableat 39 CONG. REC. 3823, 3824. The
Senate continues to cite this report as an authoritative source on what constitutes a recess of
the Senate. See also Riddick's Senate Procedure947 & n.46 (1992) (citing report), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-RIDDICK- 1992/pdf/GPO-RIDDICK- 1992-88.pdf.
4. No. 12-1115, 2013 WL 276024, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).
5. See Uncharted Territory: What are the Consequences of President Obama's
Unprecedented "Recess" Appointments: Before the Comm. On Oversight and Government
Reform, 112th Cong. 41 (2012) [hereinafter Unchartered Territory] (statement of Hon.
Michael S. Lee, U.S. Senator from the State of Utah); see also Lawfulness Recess Appt.,
supra note 2, at 12.
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will serve as an impasse to a constitutional challenge of President
Barack Obama's recess appointment of Richard Cordray as director of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (hereinafter "Bureau"). Part
II of this piece explores the political preface to Cordray's appointment.
This Part considers recent judicial challenges to the appointments of
both Cordray and concurrently appointed members of the National
Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "Board"). Part III of this Note
examines the Recess Appointment Clause of the United States
Constitution, as well as the constitutionality of President Obama's
Part IV
January 2012 recess appointment of Richard Cordray.
Article
of
the
addresses the prudential and constitutional requirements
III standing doctrine as interpreted by the Court in its seminal decision,
Raines v. Byrd.6 This part then matches an array of potential plaintiffs
with the likelihood of satisfying the federal courts' robust standing
Lastly, notwithstanding the United States Court of
requirements.
Appeals for the District of Columbia's (hereinafter "D.C. Circuit")
decision in Canning, this Note concludes by suggesting that the validity
of Bureau regulations is not threatened by the recess appointment of
Richard Cordray.
II. BACKGROUND
The January 4, 2012, recess appointment of Richard Cordray
has generated enormous controversy among Congressional and
mainstream Republicans alike.7 After this contentious appointment, it
was widely assumed that lawsuits would be filed against the Bureau,
declaring the appointment void as the product of an unconstitutional
presidential recess appointment. 8 Indeed, litigants in numerous cases
pending in the D.C. Circuit and in other federal courts have raised the
issue of President Obama's January 2012 recess appointments. 9 In fact,

6. 521 U.S. 811,818(1997).
7. See Kevin Wack, CFPB Move Sparks Legal, PoliticalHeat, AM. BANKER (Jan. 6,
2012), https://www.americanbanker.com/issues/1774/cfpb-cordray-recess-appointmentlegal-political-fallout- 1045477-1 .html?zkDo=emailArticlePrompt.
8. See Rachel Witkowski, Texas Bank to Take Lead in CFPB Lawsuit, AM. BANKER
(June 21, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177120/texas-bank-to-take-lead-incfpb-lawsuit- 1050307-1 .html.
9. Lawrence E. Dub6, Appointments and Nominations: D.C. Circuit Ponders Recess
Appointments And Competing Views of President'sPower, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 6,
at
available
Dub6],
[hereinafter
2012

2013]
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a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit struck down President Obama's
recess appointments of three members to the Board.') Relying heavily
on a textual and original understanding of the Constitution, the court
held that the appointments were not made during "the Recess" of the
Senate, nor did the relevant vacancies arise during "the Recess.'' l This
"novel and unprecedented"' 12 decision now casts serious doubt on
whether President's Obama's recess appointment of Richard Cordray to
13
the Bureau is constitutional.
Cordray's appointment is under direct attack in the litigation of
State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring, Tex. v. Geithner.14 The plaintiffs, a
small national bank in Texas and two non-profit organizations in
Washington, D.C., have brought suit against the Bureau, inter alia, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 5 The
Complaint alleges that Cordray was appointed to office neither with the
advice and consent of the Senate, nor during a Senate recess. 6 In

http://news.bna.com/bdln/BDLNWB/split display.adp? fedfid=28850612&vname=bbdbulall
=
=
issues&wsn=498213500&searchid 19163807&doctypeid= 1&type=date&mode=doc&split
0&scm=BDLNWB&pg=0. On November 30, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit heard arguments in two combined cases, Richards v. NLRB, No. 12-1973,
and Lugo v. NLRB, No. 12-1984, that raise the issue of President Obama's January 2012
recess appointments. Judges William J. Bauer, Ilana Diamond Rovner, and Ann Claire
Williams have taken the cases under advisement. The NLRB has informed the D.C. Circuit
that the constitutionality of the NLRB recess appointments has been raised by parties in
eight cases in the D.C. Circuit. In addition to the Richards and Lugo cases, the issue has
been raised and briefed in four cases pending before the Third and Fourth circuits. In
another case filed in the D.C. Circuit case, Centerfor Social Change Inc. v. NLRB, No. 121161, oral argument was schedule for December 5, 2012, but the plaintiff agreed with
NLRB on the entry of a consent judgment, which the court approved on December 3, 2012.
See id.
10. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 2013 WL 276024, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).
11. Id. at * 16, *21 (holding that "the Recess" is limited to intersession recesses). The
Board conceded at oral argument that the appointments at issue were not made during "the
Recess." The President made his three appointments to the Board on January 4, 2012, which
was after Congress began a new session on January 3. Id. at 16.
12. Kate Berry, Cordray Recess Appointment Called into Question with Court Ruling,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 25, 2013) (quoting Jay Carney, White House spokesman),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/l 78_ 18/with-nlrb-ruling-cordray-recess[hereinafter Berry]. Mr. Carney also
appointment-called-into-question-1056185-l.html
stated that the decision contradicted more than 280 intrasession recess appointments made
by both Republicans and Democrats since 1887. See id.
13. Id. (quoting Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell).
14. No. 1: 12-cv-01032-esh (D.D.C. 2012); see also Dub6, supra note 9.
15. Pls.' Compl. at 2, State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring, Tex. v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv01032-esh (D.D.C. filed June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Pl.'s Compl.], available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/97863924/SNB-v-Geithner-Complaint.
16. Id. The plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of the Bureau, certain pieces
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support of the claim, the plaintiffs cite three grounds, all of which
suggest that the recess appointment was an unconstitutional exercise of
presidential authority. First, the plaintiffs argue that the Constitution
provides the Senate with the exclusive power to determine its rules,
noting that the Senate declared itself to be in session at the time Cordray
was appointed. 17 Second, the plaintiffs contend that the House of
Representatives did not consent to a Senate adjournment of longer than
three days, as it must to effect a recess.' 8 Lastly, the plaintiffs note that
the Senate passed significant economic policy legislation during the
session that Cordray was appointed, an apparent indicator that the
chamber was not in a period of recess. 19 For these reasons, the plaintiffs
argue that the Senate was not in recess; thus, the President was not
authorized to appoint Cordray as the director of the Bureau in the
absence of Senate confirmation.2°
In defense of the claim, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
argues that the plaintiffs do not possess Article III standing to bring suit.
As such, on November 20, 2012, the DOJ moved the court to dismiss
the claim.2 ' Despite the DOJ's motion, if the court's decision in
Canning remains controlling authority on the issue, the decision will
become binding precedent on the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, where the current challenge to Cordray's
appointment awaits judicial consideration.22 The significance of the
Canning decision is that, simultaneously with the putative recess
appointments of three members to the Board, the President also utilized
the same recess appointment authority to appoint Cordray as the first

of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council.
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id. at 1 82. The Constitution requires that neither House, during the session of
Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. According to the plaintiffs, the House of Representatives never
consented to a Senate adjournment of longer than three days.
19. Pis.' Compl., supra note 15, at 83.
20. The president has the power, provided two-thirds "of the Senators present
concur. .. [to] appoint all other officers of the United States .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
21. Defs.' Mem. at 15, 48, State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring, Tex. v. Geithner, No. 1:12cv-01032-esh (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20,2012).
22. Client Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell on Implications for the CFPB
After the D.C. Circuit's Recess Appointments Decision 2 (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Davis
Polk] (on file with author).
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Director of the Bureau.23

Hence, it is possible that Cordray's

appointment may be found to be defective as well.2 4
The President's power to appoint the director of the Bureau

derives from section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank").25 Until the director is in
place, the Bureau may enforce existing regulations that it inherited from
the other banking regulators, but it may not exercise any new powers,
including its authority over non-banks. 26 Dodd-Frank largely precludes
the Bureau from supervising nonbank institutions without a Director in
place.2 7

Following President Obama's recess appointment of Richard
Cordray as the director of the Bureau, the agency began operating at its

full statutory capacity. In fact, shortly after Cordray's installation as the
Bureau's director, Cordray announced the implementation of the
Bureau's supervision program for nonbank financial institutions. 28
Accordingly, the Bureau's flagship nonbank supervision rule was
proposed on February 17, 2012.29
In sum, Title X of Dodd-Frank created the Bureau to enforce

federal consumer financial laws and regulations. 30 The Bureau's
statutory obligations are grounded in the goal of making markets for
consumer financial products and services work in a fair, transparent,
and competitive manner. 3' This new authority includes the ability to
23.

Client Alert, Joseph T. Lynyak, 1II, et al., D.C. Circuit Court Decision Calls Into

Question the Constitutionality of the Appointment of the Director of the CFPB 1 (Jan. 28,
2013) [hereinafter Lynyak] (on file with author).
24.

Id.

25. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010).
26. Id. § 5512. A "nonbank" is a company that offers or provides consumer financial
products or services but does not have a bank, thrift, or credit union charter.
27. See Review of CFPB Implementation Planning Activities, FRB OIG 2011-03,
OIG-1 1-088 at 3-4 (July 15, 2011), availableat http://federalreserve.gov/oig/files/OIG 2011
Review of CFPB Implementation Planning Activities.pdf.
28. See Lynyak, supra note 23.
29. See 12 CFR pt. § 1090 (2012). The Bureau proposed the initial rule to begin
defining who meets the test for "larger participants" in certain nonbank markets. The Bureau
will establish procedures to supervise a nonbank company where the Bureau has reasonable
cause to believe it poses risks to consumers. See also Press Release, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Launches Nonbank Supervision
Program (Jan. 5, 2012) (on file with author).
30. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (Supp. IV 2010).
31. See id.; Elizabeth Warren, Warren Outlines CFPB's Mission for Consumers, 30
ABI
INST.
10
(2011)
[hereinafter
Warren],
available
at
http://journal.abi.org/sites/default/files/201 1/March/LegUp_0.pdf.
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oversee nonbanks and the ability to prohibit unfair, deceptive, abusive
acts or practices. 32 Since the appointment of Cordray, the Bureau has
promulgated numerous provisions aimed at creating a level playing field
where both parties to the transaction understand the terms of the deal,
where the price and the risk of products are clear, and where direct
comparisons can be made from one product to another.33 Overall, the
Bureau endeavors to promote transparency between the consumer and
the financial institution.34
From the beginning, the overwhelming majority of Republicans
35
disagreed with the underlying policies and practices of the Bureau.
The contentiousness surrounding the creation of the Bureau became
apparent early when only three House Republicans voted in favor of
Dodd-Frank in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. 36 Additional
opposition was reflected in efforts by congressional Republicans to
delay the President's attempt at nominating a director to head the
agency.37 In exchange for the votes necessary to confirm a director, as
specified under Dodd-Frank, congressional Republicans demanded that
38
the Obama Administration agree to structural changes in the agency.
Mindful of Republican opposition in the Senate, President Obama
refrained from nominating Elizabeth Warren, the popular consumer

32. See id. 12 U.S.C. § 551 l(b)(2); Kate Davidson, Will Cordray Recess Appointment
Cloud
CFPB's
Future,
AM.
BANKER
(Jan.
5,
2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_3/obama-cordray-cfpb- 1045446-1 .html

[hereinafter Davidson].
33.

See id. 12 U.S.C. § 5511; Warren, supranote 31.

34. See id. 12 U.S.C. § 5511; Warren, supra note 31 ("When consumers are presented
with a choice ... and they know the true costs, the actual benefits, and the real risks of those
products, they will be better able to make decisions for themselves and their families.").
35. Rob Blackwell, Why D.C. Gridlock Will Keep CFPB Leaderless for Years, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 5,2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_151 /warren-cordraycfpb-recess-appointmentsobama- 1040929-1 .html.
36. Catherine Dunn, Reflections on Dodd-Frank, Two Years Later, CORP. COUNSEL
(July 19, 2012), available at

http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 1202563526466&ReflectionsonDoddFrankTwoYearsLater&slretum=20121003141525.
37. Kevin Wack, GOP Shifts Tactics on CFPB Concerns, AM. BANKER (Feb. 1, 2012),
https://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_21/cordray-cfpb-legal-challenges- 1046228-

1.html [hereinafter Wack].
38. Id. Senate Republicans pledged to oppose the confirmation of the Director until the
Bureau's leadership structure is changed from unitary Director to a five-member board and
until other federal banking regulators could more easily overrule actions by the Bureau that
it thought may undermine the soundness and safety of the financial system.
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advocate who helped establish the agency as a special adviser to the
President, to head the Bureau. 39 The President instead exercised his
Recess Appointment Clause power to appoint Richard Cordray as the
first director of the Bureau. 40 This unchartered recess appointment
4
prompted national and congressional callings for judicial intervention. '
III. RECESS APPOINTMENT
A.

CLAUSE,

ART. II,

§ 2, CL. 3

HistoricalPerspective

The Recess Appointment Clause of the United States
Constitution provides the president with the "power to fill up all
vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. ' " 2 A
recess of the Senate has been defined as a break in Senate
proceedings.4 3 Furthermore, the term recess has been divided into two
separate breaks of Congress: intrasession and intersession.4 4 A recess
within a session is referred to as an intrasession recess, while the break
between the sine die adjournment of one session and the convening of
the next is referred to as an intersession recess.45 Although the Court
has not opined on the issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Recess Appointment Clause permits the
President to fill vacancies, to assure the proper functioning of our
government, during both intrasession recesses and intersession
recesses. 46 In stark contrast, however, the D.C. Circuit recently held
that a president may only make intersession recess appointments.4 7 This

39. Deborah Solomon, Obama to Nominate Consumer Bureau ChiefNext Week, WALL
ST. J., July 15, 2011, available at

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/07/15/obama-to-

nominate-consumer-bureau-chief-next-week/.
40. Berry, supra note 12 (noting that the Canning decision comes just one day after
President Obama re-nominated Cordray to the CFPB post on January 24, 2013).
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Wack, supra note 27.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
See HOGUE, supra note 2, at 10.
Id. at 2.

45. Id. The Senate defines adjournment sine die as the end of a legislative session
"without day." These adjournments are used to indicate the final adjournment of an annual
or the two-year session of a Congress.
46.
47.

See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004).
Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 2013 WL 276024, at *16 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,

2013). ("[An] appointment may be made in 'the Recess,' but it ends at the end of the next
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distinction is highly relevant, particularly in the Canning litigation, as
both the petitioners and respondents conceded that the subject recess
appointments were made during an intrasession recess.4a Before the
Canning decision, recent presidents appointed officers during both
intersession and intrasession recess appointments. 49
The Constitution does not specify the length of time that the
Senate must be in recess before the president may make a recess
appointment. 50 Because neither chamber may take a break of more than
three days without the consent of the other,5 ' the modem legislature has
employed the use of pro forma sessions to avoid a recess of more than
three days, and, therefore, the necessity of obtaining the consent of the
other house. 52 These periodic three-day sessions can last only a few
seconds and apparently only require the presence of one senator.53
Beginning in late 2007, and continuing into the 112th Congress,
the Senate has frequently conducted pro forma sessions during recesses
occurring within sessions of Congress.54 Aside from circumventing the
adjournment requirement, pro forma sessions appear to serve another
purpose. From November 2007 through the end of George W. Bush's
presidency, the Senate employed pro forma sessions to prevent
President Bush from making recess appointments. On November 17,
2007, the Senate majority leader announced that the Senate would be
meeting for pro forma sessions during the Thanksgiving holiday to

'Session.' The natural interpretation of the Clause is that the Constitution is noting a
difference between 'the Recess' and the 'Session.' Either the Senate is in session, or it is in
the recess. If it has broken for three days within an ongoing session, it is not in 'the
Recess."').
48. Id. at *8.
49.

See HOGUE, supra note 2, at 10. For example, On December 23, 1982, President

Ronald W. Reagan, during an intersession recess, appointed John C. Miller to be a member
of the NLRB. On May 31, 1996, President William J. Clinton, during an intrasession recess,
appointed Johnny H. Hayes to be a member of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
50. Id. at 2.
51.

52.
53.

4.
SeeU.S. CONST. art. I,§5, cl.
See HOGUE, supra note 2, at 4.
See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. D1404 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 2011) (noting that day's pro

forma session lasted from 11:00:02 until 11:00:34 a.m.); 157 CONG. REC. D903 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 2011) (noting that day's pro forma session lasted from 12:00:08 until 12:00:32
p.m.). See also Lawfulness Recess Appt., supra note 2, at 13.
54. See Lawfulness Recess Appt., supra note 2, at 2 (noting that a "pro forma" session
is a brief meeting of the Senate).
55.

See HOGUE, supra note 2, at 8.
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prevent presidential recess appointments. 56 The use of the pro forma
sessions appeared to have achieved its stated intent: President Bush
57
made no recess appointments during this time.
Between the beginning of the Reagan presidency in January
1981 and the end of December 2011, the shortest intrasession recess
during which a President made a recess appointment was ten days.58
Historically, only two Presidents have made a recess appointment
during a recess of three days or less. 59 President Truman made a recess
appointment to a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board during a threeday intersession recess. Importantly, however, this appointment was
made after the 80th Congress adopted a concurrent resolution prior to its
recess.6° On another occasion,6 ' President Theodore Roosevelt made
over 160 recess appointments during a transition between sessions of
less than a day in length, where no concurrent resolution regarding the
transition between sessions had been adopted.62 The Senate Judiciary
Committee issued a report condemning President Roosevelt's recess
appointments, noting that the Recess Appointment Clause "was
carefully devised so as to accomplish the purpose in view [filling
vacancies during a recess of the Senate], without in the slightest degree
changing the policy of the Constitution, that such appointments are only
to be made with the participation of the Senate." 63 The Committee
criticized the President's act of unilaterally making appointments during
a "constructive recess" and maintained that [the Framers] had in mind a

56. See 153 CONG REC. S14609 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid on Recess Appointments).
57.

See HOGUE, supra note 2, at 4.

58. See "Digest of Other White House Announcements," Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, vol. 18 (December 23, 1982), p. 1662. President Ronald W.
Reagan recess appointed John C. Miller to be a member of the National Labor Relations
Board on December 23, 1982, during a recess that began that day and lasted until the Senate
reconvened on January 3, 1983; HOGUE, supra note 2, at n. 13.
59.

See HOGUE, supra note'2, at 10.

60.

Id.

61.

See supra p. 1.

62. See S. REP. No. 58-4389, at 2 (1905), availableat 39 CONG. REC. 3823, 3824; see
also Daugherty Opinion, 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20, 24 (1921) (noting that this report was "most
significant of all" authorities in supporting the conclusion that a substantial intrasession
adjournment was a constitutional "recess").
63. Mike Lee, Was President Barack Obama's January 2012 Recess Appointment of
Richard Cordray Constitutional, FORBES
(Apr.
3,
2012),
available at

http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2012/04/03/was-president-barack-obamas-january-2012recess-appointment-of-richard-cordray-constitutional/.

[Vol. 17

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

period of time in which it would be harmful if an office were not
filled-not a constructive, inferred, or imputed recess as opposed to an
actual one."6 4
B.

President Obama's Recess Appointment of Richard Cordray

In May 2011, forty-four Senators signed a petition stating that
they would oppose the confirmation of any nominee to serve as director
of the Bureau until substantive changes to the structure of the Bureau
were enacted into law.65 On December 17, 2011, the Senate agreed by
unanimous consent to adjourn and convene for pro forma sessions only,
with no business conducted, every Tuesday and Friday between that
date and January 23, 2012.66 On January 4, 2012, despite the periodic
pro forma sessions of the Senate, and in the absence of a concurrent
resolution between the two Houses, President Obama exercised his
Recess Appointment Clause power and announced the appointment of
Richard Cordray as the first director of the Bureau. 67 This appointment,
executed during a three-day intrasession recess between two pro-forma
sessions, has presented many unresolved constitutional issues.
C.

Constitutionality

After the appointment of Cordray, a political fulmination
ripened among constitutional scholars and commentators. Those
viewing the January 2012 recess appointments as constitutional tend to
rely on a functional understanding of the Recess Appointment Clause
power, positing the view that pro forma sessions cannot be used to
nullify the President's recess appointment authority. 68 On the other
64.

S. REP. No. 58-4389, available at 39 CONG. REc. 3823, 3824 (1905).

65. See News Release, Sen. Richard Shelby, 44 U.S. Senators to Obama: No
Accountability, No Confirmation (May 5, 2011) (on file with United States Senate).
66. See 157 CONG. REC. S8783 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Ron
Wyden).
67.

See DAVID

H.

CARPENTER,

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S

JANUARY

4,

2012, RECESS

APPOINTMENTS: LEGAL ISSUES, C.R.S. REP. No. R42323, at 6 (2012) [hereinafter
CARPENTER]. The President also appointed Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F.
Griffin Jr. as members of the National Labor Relations Board. These were the appointments
struck down in Canning.
68. See Uncharted Territory, supra note 5, at 100-07 (statement of Michael J.
Gerhardt, Samuel Ashe distinguished professor in constitutional law and director for the
Center of Law and Government, University of North Carolina School of Law).

2013]
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hand, scholars labeling the recess appointment unconstitutional argue,
inter alia, that Cordray's appointment was made without receiving the
advice and consent of the Senate, a bedrock constitutional
requirement. 69 These advocates argue that the appointment was not
made during a Senate recess, at least the kind of recess cognizable under
the Recess Appointment Clause.7 °
1. Arguments Supporting Constitutionality
Two days after the controversial appointment of Cordray, the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") released a
memorandum opining that the recess appointment constituted a valid
exercise of the President's Recess Appointment Clause power.7' In its
opinion, the OLC considered whether a recess that is punctuated by
periodic pro forma sessions, at which Congress has declared in advance
that no business is to be conducted, is sufficient to invoke a president's
recess appointment power. 72 In concluding that the President may make
recess appointments during periodic pro forma sessions, the OLC cited
both the Framers' original understanding, as well as a functional
interpretation of the Recess Appointment Clause:
First, both the Framers' original understanding of the
Recess Appointments Clause and the longstanding
views of the Executive and Legislative Branches support
the conclusion that the President may make recess
appointments when he determines that, as a practical
matter, the Senate is not available to give advice and
consent to executive nominations. The Recess
Appointments Clause was adopted to allow the
President to fill offices when the Senate was not "in
session for the appointment of officers." The Federalist
No. 67, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton). And, from the
early days of the Republic, the Executive has taken the

69. Id. at 26 (statement of Hon. Michael S. Lee, U.S. Senator from the State of Utah).
70. Id.
71. See Lawfulness Recess Appt., supra note 2 (finding the President's recess
appointments as a valid exercise of presidential authority).
72. See id. at 4.
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position that "all vacancies which ...happen to exist at
a time when the Senate cannot be consulted as to filling
them, may be temporarily filled by the President."
Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
at 633. Likewise, in 1905, the Senate Judiciary
Committee defined "recess" as used in the Clause to be
the period of time when the Senate cannot "participate
' 73
as a body in making appointments."
Furthermore, the OLC reasoned that allowing the Senate to
prevent the President from exercising his authority under the Recess
Appointment Clause by holding pro forma sessions would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the Recess Appointment Clause; 74 the
purpose, of course, is to provide a method of appointment when the
Senate is unavailable to provide its advice and consent function. 5 In a
written statement to Congress, Professor Michael J. Gerhardt of the
University of North Carolina School of Law noted that President
Obama construed the pro forma sessions "effectively as breaks during
which the Senate was unable to take any action on his nominations. 7 6
Similarly, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Beth S. Brinkmann,
arguing for the government in Canning, stated that the Senate was
functionally in an extended recess in January 2012 when President
Obama made the subject recess appointments.7 7
Indeed, the
overarching theme of these arguments appears to be that because the
Senate cannot exercise its advice and consent function during pro forma
sessions, these sessions constitute a recess of the Senate for purposes of
the Recess Appointment Clause.78 While the United States Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue, the court in Canning wholly rejected
this argument. The Canningcourt explained, "Allowing the President to

73. Id. at 13 (internal citations omitted).
74. Id.at 4.
75. Id.at 15.
76. Uncharted Territory, supra note 5, at 104 (statement of Michael J. Gerhardt,
Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law).
77. See Dub&, supra note 9.
78. See generally Lawfulness Recess Appt., supra note 2 (noting that when
determining whether an intrasession adjournment constitutes a recess in the constitutional
sense, the touchstone is "its practical effect: viz., whether or not the Senate is capable of
exercising its constitutional function of advising and consenting to executive
nominations.").

2013]

CFPB AND ARTICLE 11I STANDING

define the scope of his own appointments power would eviscerate the
Constitution's separation of powers. 79
2. Arguments Against Constitutionality
Other observers have taken the position that President Obama's
putative recess appointment of Cordray was an unconstitutional exercise
of his Recess Appointment Clause authority. 80 During oral arguments
in the Canning case, 8 1 Judge Thomas B. Griffith noted that recess
appointments have become an occasion for presidents frustrated by
Senate delay to make "almost metaphysical arguments" in favor of
recess appointments. 82 The judge said the result could be that a
president who cannot win Senate confirmation for a nominee gets "two
bites at the apple" by making a recess appointment. 83 This colloquy
transpired before the court ruled unanimously to strike down the
President's recess appointments of three members to the Board,
rendering the Board's disputed decision void for a lack of quorum.
Furthermore, Edwin Meese, former U.S. Attorney General
under President Ronald Reagan, contends that a president cannot choose
what sessions of the Senate he deems to be "real., 84 Meese argues that
pro forma sessions are not constitutionally meaningless and highlights
the fact that bills can be passed during a pro forma hearing.8 5 Likewise,
Mike Lee, U.S. Senator from Utah, deemed the appointment
unconstitutional by drawing an analogy to President Roosevelt's 1903
recess appointments. 86 According to Lee, President Obama's unilateral
appointment of Cordray while the Senate was holding pro-forma
79.
2013).
80.

Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 2013 WL 276024, at *13 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
See Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Obama's Recess Appointments are

Unconstitutional,WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.corn/opinions/obamas-recess-appointments-areunconstitutional/2012/01/05/gIQAnWRfdP-story.html; see also Mike Lee, Was President
Barack Obama's January 2012 Recess Appointment of Richard Cordray Constitutional,

FORBES (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2012/04/03/was-presidentbarack-obamas-january-2012-recess-appointment-of-richard-cordray-constitutional/.
81.

See supra pp. 3-4.

82. See Dub6, supra note 9.
83. Id.
84.
85.

See Meese, supra note 80.
See id.

86.

See Lee, supra note 80.
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sessions was an attempt to fabricate a constructive, inferred, or imputed
recess;87 and, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the proposition
that a constructive recess is a recess sufficient to invoke the President's
Recess Appointment Clause power. 88 Further, Senate Minority Leader,
Mitch McConnell, claims that the President has overstepped his
constitutional authority by removing Congress' role in examining
nominees. 89 This, according to McConnell, provides the President with
free rein to avoid senatorial advice and consent, which is a major
90
structural feature of the Constitution.
Of note, the plaintiffs in Geithner argue that the Senate has the
exclusive power to determine its rules; therefore, when it proclaimed to
be in recess in January 2012, it was, in fact, in a period of recess. 91 This
argument has been somewhat complicated by the Senate's recent
reluctance to appear in an amicus role to recent challenges to the
appointments, leaving courts without a full statement of the Senate's
views. 92 In fact, Judge Griffith, during the Canning proceedings,
unsuccessfully probed litigants for the Senate's position regarding the
January 2012 pro forma proceedings.93 Indeed, the novel twist in
President Obama's recess appointments is that the Senate did not
94
believe it was in a period of recess.
The Canning decision drew a distinction between "a recess" and
"the Recess." 95 The court, employing literal, textual constitutional
interpretation, noted that the word "the" was and is a definite article;
thus, "the Recess" was something other than a generic break in the

87.
88.

See id.
See id.;
see also supra pp. 12-13.

89.
90.

See Wack, supra note 37.
See Michael McConnell, Democrats and Executive Overreach, WALL ST. J., Aug.

20,

2012,

available

at

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204257504577150661990141658.html.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings."); Pls.' Compl., supranote 15, at 81.
92. See Dub&, supra note 9. The Senate refused to participate in an amicus role in the
Canningcase.
93. See id.

94. See Davis Polk, supra note 22, at 1-2 (differentiating between the recess
appointment upheld in Evans from the recess appointments that were struck down in
Canning).
95. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 2013 WL 276024, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).
The Canning court relied heavily on a literal, textual interpretation of the Constitution.
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proceedings. 96 "The Recess," according to the court, denoted a period
between sessions that would end with the ensuing session of the
Senate. 97 The Canning court concluded that President Obama's recess
appointments did not occur during "the Recess," but rather during an
ongoing session. 98 As such, the court nullified the recess appointments.
Because the Canning decision has no direct effect on the
Bureau, a plaintiff will have to challenge the Cordray appointment in a
separate action. 99 Thus, ipso facto, a plaintiff bringing suit in federal
court must satisfy the Article III standing requirements.' 0 0

IV. ARTICLE III STANDING
Those who do not possess Article III standing may not litigate
as suitors in the federal courts of the United States. 10 1 In the matter of
Allen v. Wright,0 2 the Court reiterated its time-honored concern about
10 3
keeping the judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere.
The Court emphasized that Article III standing is built on the idea of
separation of powers, and that instead of resolving cases for the sake of
convenience and efficiency, it will carefully confirm that the plaintiff
has met the burden of standing under Article 111.104 Although the Court
has established a number of justiciability doctrines to ensure that a
claim is properly before a court, concerns relating to standing appear to
present the most probable hurdles to the judicial resolution of a
challenge to President Obama's recess appointments.10 5 The Court

96. Id. at *8-9 (stating that the Framers did not mean "a recess").
97. Id. at *9. The Canning court noted that the Senate is in session, or it is in "the
Recess." If it has broken for three days within an ongoing session, it is no in "the Recess."

Id.
98. Id. at *16. The court also held that the president may only fill vacancies arising
during "the Recess," as opposed to vacancies that happen to exist during the recess. The
court found the relevant vacancies to not arise during the intersession recess of the Senate.
Id. at *21.
99. See Berry, supra note 12.
100. Advisory Opinion, Alston & Bird L.L.P., The Impact of Noel Canning on Richard
Cordray's Directorship of the CFPB and on CFPB Post-Appointment Activity 4 (Jan. 29,
2013) [hereinafter Alston] (on file with author).
101. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United For Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
102. 104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984).
103. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
104. Id. at 818.
105. CARPENTER, supra note 67, at 6.
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espoused an interpretation of the Article III standing doctrine in the
flagship case, Raines v. Byrd." 6
A.

The Raines Decision

Members of the 104th Congress opposed the Line Item Veto
Act, which gave the President the authority to cancel certain spending
and tax benefit measures after he signed them into law. 10 7 The day after
the Act went into effect, congressional opponents filed suit against
Executive Branch officials, challenging the Act's constitutionality. 0 8 In
finding that the challengers did not have the requisite standing to bring
suit, the Court stated that the Plaintiffs did not base their claim on a
personal injury but rather on the basis of political loss. 109 Moreover, the
Court held that historical practice refutes the Congress members'
position.o The Court referenced analogous confrontations between
one or both Houses and the Executive Branch where no suit was
brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power. 1
Although granting standing in such a case would not be irrational, the
2
Constitution has a more restrictive role for Article III courts."
B.

ConstitutionalRequirements

The United States Constitution grants the federal courts judicial
power over cases or controversies. 1 3 One requirement of case-orcontroversy jurisdiction is that the plaintiff must have standing to sue. 14
This requirement, which the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing,
focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring suit,
although this inquiry often turns on the nature and source of the claim

106. 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
107.

See id.

108. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
109. Id. at 821. ("[Plaintiffs] base their claim on a loss of political power, not loss of
something to which they are personally entitled, such as their seats as Members of Congress
after their constituents elected.").
110.
I11.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.

113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the exercise of federal judicial power to
"cases" and "controversies."); see Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
114.

Raines, 521 U.S. at 818.
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presented.'
To meet the Article III standing requirement, a two-fold
showing by the plaintiff is required.' 16 First, the plaintiff must allege
personal injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's alleged
unlawful conduct. 1 7 In other words, the plaintiff must establish that she
has a personal stake in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury
suffered is particularized as to her." 8 Next, the plaintiff must show that
the unlawful conduct is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 19
The Court has emphasized that the alleged injury must be legally and
judicially cognizable, i.e., the plaintiff has suffered "an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is ...concrete and particularized, and

that the dispute is 'traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
the
The Court has labeled
through the judicial process. ,,120
1 21
requirement.
bedrock
a
standing
of
requirement
constitutional
C.

PrudentialRequirements

The question of standing involves both constitutional limitations
22
on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.
These self-imposed prudential limitations are founded in concern about
the proper limited-role of the courts in the democratic society. 23 By
law, Congress can grant a right to sue to a plaintiff who otherwise lacks
standing. 124 According to the Court, however, such a law can only
eliminate prudential, as opposed to constitutional, standing
25
requirements.
In order to satisfy the prudential requirements of standing, a
plaintiff's injury must fall within the "zone of interests" protected or
regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee in
115.
116.

Id.
Id.

117.

Id.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975)).
123.

Id.

124.

See Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3.

125. Id.
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question.' 26 The plaintiff must assert her own legal rights and interests
and cannot rest her claim for relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties. 27 Furthermore, even when a plaintiff asserts injury
recognizable under the Article III requirements, the Court has abstained
from "adjudicating abstract questions of wide public significance which
amount to generalized grievances, pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches."' 28 The policy
behind these prudential guidelines tends to parallel the policies reflected
in the Article III requirement of actual or threatened injury susceptible
to judicial remedy. 129 Notwithstanding the satisfaction of the foregoing
substitute such a showing
prudential considerations, a plaintiff cannot
1 30
requirements.
III
for the rigorous Article
1. Private Individual Challenge
In the context of directly challenging a Presidential recess
appointment, the injury component of the standing requirement is
difficult, if not insurmountable, to satisfy. 13 1 Because a private
individual is presumably not involved in the recess appointment
process, it would be exceedingly difficult for an individual to allege
injury stemming from the recess appointment itself.'3 2 In other words,
an individual plaintiff claiming injury resulting from the President's
recess appointment alone will not survive constitutional muster, at least
in terms of standing. For instance, in the matter of Bush v. Gore,1 33 a
private individual plaintiff could not have obtained standing to
challenge the conclusions of the Florida ballot counts. 134 This is largely
because an individual private plaintiff does not have a personal stake in

126. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
127. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United For Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Interview with Michael Gerhardt, Samuel

Ashe distinguished

professor in

constitutional law and director for the Center of Law and Government, University of North
Carolina School of Law (Sept. 19, 2012).
132.
133.

Id.
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (resolving the ballot recount dispute during the 2000

presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore).
134.

Gerhardt, supra note 131.
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the matter.'
In Geithner, the broader lawsuit directly challenging Cordray's
appointment,136 the plaintiffs have not been burdened by a Bureau
enforcement action or regulation. In fact, the plaintiff bank, being
considerably smaller than $10 billion in assets, is generally not subject
to examination by the Bureau. 137 As part of the plaintiff bank's effort to
assert standing, it alleges that it exited the consumer mortgage lending
business in October 2010 because of regulatory uncertainty stemming
from what is characterized as an open-ended grant of authority to the
Bureau in this area. 138 As discussed above, Raines forces a plaintiff to
assert a concrete and particularized injury. 139 Thus, the injury alleged in
Geithner, i.e., the forbearance of conducting business in the mortgage
industry, is hardly an existing, concrete injury cognizable under Raines.
Because the plaintiffs have not been adversely affected by a Bureau
enforcement action, and because the plaintiffs are not subject to the
rules and regulations issued by the Bureau, the court is likely to grant
40
the DOJ's motion to dismiss.
2. Congressional Member Challenge
As of January 2013, no senator has tested the standing doctrine
Indeed, it is
in challenging a presidential recess appointment.
questionable whether a senator could claim personal injury from such
an appointment.' 4 1 The standing inquiry is "especially rigorous" when
reaching the merits of a dispute would force a court to decide the
constitutionality of an action taken by one of the other two branches of
the Federal Government.142 If a member of Congress initiated an action
to challenge the President's recess appointment, the Court would
employ a more searching, comprehensive standing inquiry143-as it did
135.

Id.

136. See Davis Polk, supra note 22, at 1; see also suprapp. 4-6.
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2006).
138. Pls.' Comp., supra note 15, at 12.
139. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997); see supra pp. 20-23.
140. See Davis Polk, supra note 22, at 3 (predicting that it is likely that the district court
will grant the DOJ's motion to dismiss).
141. Patrick Hein, Comment, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The
Effectiveness of PoliticalCounterweights, 96 CAL. L. REv. 235, 250 (2008).
142. Raines, 521 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 819.
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in Raines. Thus, the Raines decision seems to insinuate that members
of Congress do not have standing to bring a case in their own capacity
44
but may be capable of participating as amici curiae.1
As a caveat, however, the Court has held that a congressional
member, serving as a plaintiff, may gain standing by alleging an
1 45
institutional injury but only if the injury amounts to vote nullification.
The Raines Court suggested that vote nullification may, under certain
circumstances, satisfy the injury component of the standing
requirement. 146 In Campbell v. Clinton,147 the D.C. Circuit held that
vote nullification only occurs if Congress has no other legislative
remedies available to rectify its alleged injury. 148 In terms of a
presidential recess appointment, Congress undoubtedly has other
legislative remedies at its disposal to counteratttack a defective recess
appointment. For instance, Congress could repeal the legislation that
created the agency from the beginning. 49 Congress could also dilute
the authority of the Bureau director, transferring such authority to
another individual or entity. 50
These legislative remedies, among
others, call into question the possibility of a congressional plaintiff
satisfying the injury component of the standing doctrine.151
3. Congressional Institution Challenge
Another conceivable route for contesting the President's recess
appointment is a judicial action by a congressional institution as a

144. Uncharted Territory, supra note 5, at 41 (arguing before the House Judiciary
Committee, Senator Lee noted that much doubt surrounds the proposition that members of
Congress could establish standing in this context).
145. Raines, 521 U.S. at 812 (distinguishing vote nullification in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939) by noting that in Coleman the Court held that "state legislators who had
been locked in a tie vote that would have defeated the State's ratification of a proposed
federal constitutional amendment, and who alleged that their votes were nullified when the
Lieutenant Governor broke the tie by casting his vote for ratification, had a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."); see also CARPENTER,
supra note 67, at 3.
146. Raines, 521 U.S. at 822.
147. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 22-23.
149. See CARPENTER, supra note 67, at 9. Congress abolished the longstanding Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1995.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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whole. On numerous occasions, courts have permitted a plaintiff to
bring suit on behalf of a congressional institution. 52 In the principal
1 53
case, United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("AT&T'), the House of Representatives designated a member of a
House subcommittee to act on its behalf in a suit brought by the DOJ to
enjoin a telephone company from complying with a subpoena. 54 The
House, prior to bringing suit, passed a resolution authorizing a member
of the subcommittee, Chairman Moss, to sue for an institutional injury,
or more specifically to defend Congress' institutional interest in
compliance with properly issued subpoenas. 155 The AT&T court found
that the House as a whole had standing to assert its investigatory power;
156
therefore, it could designate a member to act on its behalf.
In Miers, the court found that the House Committee on the
Judiciary had standing to bring a civil action to enforce congressional
subpoenas. 57 The court, relying heavily on AT&T, stated that an
institution's authorization of the suit is the central factor that "moves [a]
case from the impermissible category of an individual plaintiff asserting
an institutional injury ...to the permissible category of an institutional
plaintiff asserting an institutional injury.' 58 Thus, it appears that in
order to gain standing, in addition to the Raines constitutional
requirements, an institutional plaintiff must be authorized 159 to bring the
suit by a house of Congress. The only institutional injuries that have
satisfied this requirement, outside of the subpoena context, have
"directly implicated the authority of Congress within [the] scheme of
government, and the scope and reach of its ability to allocate power

152.

See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976)

(holding that the House as a whole had standing to assert its investigatory power and could
designate a member to act on its behalf); see also Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that House
committee had standing to bring civil action to enforce congressional subpoenas issued to
senior presidential aides).
153. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
154. Id. at 391.
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (relying heavily on a distinction between Raines and
A T&IT).
158. Id. at 71.
159. Reed v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Del. Cnty., Pa., 277 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1928) (finding
that the committee did not have standing because the resolution granting its investigative
power did not authorize it to seek judicial recourse).
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among the three branches."' 160
For instance, in the Line Item Veto case, INS v. Chadha,'61 the
Court allowed both houses of Congress to participate in a challenge of
an act that provided both houses with the power to review and veto
executive decisions of deportation.162 Furthermore, in Coleman v.
Miller,163 the Court held that vote nullification was a sufficient
institutional injury, as it would deprive the legislators of maintaining the
1 64
effectiveness of their votes.'
In the context of recess appointments, however, the House of
Representatives would not be able to claim an institutional injury
because it does not have a direct constitutional role in recess
appointments.
Although it is recognized that the House of
Representatives has inherent voting and subpoena powers, recess
appointments do not loom within its scheme of government. On the
other hand, the Senate has a direct role in the recess appointment
process through its advice and consent function. The Senate may be
able to claim an institutional injury, but after Raines, it is unclear if the
injury would be considered concrete and personalized if the plaintiff has
legislative remedies available to redress its injury. 65 As noted above,
the Senate has legislative remedies at its disposal to counter an improper
66
presidential recess appointment.'
Furthermore, an institutional plaintiff must show that the dispute
is "traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process."' 67 Aside from the Canning ruling, historically, there has
never been a successful challenge to a presidential recess appointment.

160.

Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Senate

lacked standing to intervene because it showed no harm beyond a broad frustration of desire
to see the challenged law enforced as written).
161.
162.
163.
164.

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See id.
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
See id. This case is currently the only action in which the Court has held that

legislators alleging an institutional injury have standing; it may be an exception to Raines
injury component based on the concreteness of the alleged injury.
165.

See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). ("In addition, the conclusion

reached here neither deprives Members of Congress of an adequate remedy since they may
repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach, nor does it foreclose the Act
from constitutional challenge by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury resulting
from it.").
166.
167.

See supra p. 27.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Therefore, it is difficult to conceive that such a challenge is traditionally
thought capable of resolution through the judicial process. Because of
the foregoing reasons, and because the Court has stressed that the
standing inquiry is especially rigorous where important separation of
powers concerns are implicated by a dispute,' 68 an institutional plaintiff
69
faces an onerous task in establishing Article III standing.'
4. Plaintiff Impacted by Bureau Regulation
As a general rule, a person 170 who suffers a legal wrong because
of agency action or who is adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial
review of such action. 17 ' For instance, in New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB, 172 the Board issued a decision enforceable directly against the
plaintiff, levying mandatory conditions on the business to remedy a
violation of an agency regulation. 173 Relying on a provision that
permitted judicial review of a Board decision,17 4 the New Process Steel
Court held that the Board must have a quorum in order to lawfully take
action. 7 5 Importantly, this case suggests that a reviewing court may
inquire into whether an agency decision-maker has the authority to
lawfully act.
Analogously, in Canning, the putative recess appointees
constituted a majority of the Board's quorum, which in turn provided
the requisite authority for the Board's actions. 76 As the court
168. Raines, 521 U.S. at 819.
169. Uncharted Territory, supra note 5, at 72 (statement of C. Boyden Grey, former
White House counsel to Pres. Bush, stating that he is "skeptical" that the House of
Representatives, as a body, has standing to bring suit).
170. A "person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public
or private organization other than an agency under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5
U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
171. See Bullard v. Webster, 623 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1980) (interpreting 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2006)).
172. 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010) (holding that the business must abide to bargaining
agreement and pay employees for losses in earnings). The Canning court cited New Process
Steel when it invoked jurisdiction over the case. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 2013 WL
276024, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).
173. New Process Steel, 130 S.Ct. 2635 at 2639.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006) (permitting judicial review of a Board decision). The
Canning court cited this statute in upholding jurisdiction of the matter on review.
175. New ProcessSteel, 130 S.Ct. at 2635.
176. See Canning,2013 WL 276024, at *1.
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explained, "Because the Board must have a quorum in order to lawfully
take action, if petitioner is correct [that the Board members were not
'7 7
validly appointed], then the order under review is void ab initio.',
Relying, at least in part, on New Process Steel, the D.C. Circuit elected
to address the constitutional issue of whether the President validly
appointed three Board members, whose presence on the Board
78
comprised the quorum for the disputed decision. 1
Similar to the National Labor Relation Board's quorum
requirement, the Bureau's newly established powers are dependent on a
director being in place. 179 In other words, any non-inherited regulatory
power may be exercised only after a director is in office; otherwise, the
agency's action is not in accordance with law. Akin to Canning, in the
absence of a validly appointed director, the Bureau's enforcement action
against a plaintiff may be void ab initio.1 80 It therefore follows from
New Process Steel and Canning that any Bureau assertion of such an
enforcement power against a particular entity would likely provide that
particular entity with standing to challenge Cordray's appointment. 8 1
To date, however, the Bureau has entered only a handful of enforcement
actions (three against banks and three against debt relief companies),
conducted several exams of banks and nonbanks (but no public
supervisory action arising out of those exams), and promulgated a
number of final rules.' 82 Therefore, the class of plaintiffs qualifying
under Canning and Noel Process Steel is rather limited; nonetheless,
such a plaintiff would seemingly have standing to challenge Cordray's
appointment.
This observation is conditioned, of course, on the
Canning decision's disposition on appeal. While it is debatable whether
the Court will grant a writ of certiorari to hear the case in the first
84
place,183 if the Court were to overturn the case, the pre-Canningdoubt

177.

Id.

178. Id. at *24.
179. See Alston, supra note 100, at 2 ("The only authority held by the CFPB prior to the
appointment of Mr. Cordray was whatever authority was transferred to it from other federal
agencies. The power to prohibit unfair, deceptive or abusive acts in connection with
consumer financial products and services and the power to supervise non depository
institutions were not among those powers transferred to the CFPB.").
180. See Canning,2013 WL 276024, at *1.
181.

See Alston, supra note 100, at 3.

182. Client Alert, Morrison Foerster, D.C. Circuit Hands the CFPB a Setback? (Jan. 29,
2013) (on file with author).
183. On February 7, 2013, the Court denied an emergency application in the matter of
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surrounding a judicial challenge to a presidential recess appointment is
likely to be resuscitated. 8 5
What is less clear, however, is whether any party subject to the
rules and regulations issued by the Bureau pursuant to its Dodd-Frank
powers has standing, regardless of whether it is targeted by an
enforcement action. 18 6 The question, then, is whether these private
parties, such as a nonbank that did not previously have to account to any
federal regulator, could mount a private suit challenging the Cordray
appointment and establish standing. The D.C. Circuit has held that a
plaintiff may challenge a putative recess appointment even if the
187 Ee
appointment is "radically attenuated" to the plaintiffs injury.
Even
upon fulfilling this liberal interpretation of the injury component, a
plaintiff must establish additional constitutional and prudential standing
requirements. The plaintiffs injury must fall within the zone of
interests protected by the constitutional guarantee in question; and, the
injury must be redressable by the requested relief. Moreover, the
federal courts have abstained from adjudicating abstract questions of

HealthBridge Management v. Kreisberg, No. 3:12-ev-01299 (D. Conn. 2013). The
application contested the constitutionality of the President's putative recess appointments of
three members to the Board. The denial of the application suggests that the Court is not
willing to jump into the recess appointment fray before it is presented with a certiorari
petition in Canning or another appellate court decision ruling on the validity of the
appointments. Barbara S. Mishkin, Full U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Application
Challenging NLRB Recess Appointments, CFPB MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/02/07/full-u-s-supreme-court-rejects-applicationchallenging-nlrb-recess-appointments/.
184. This is the first time a federal appeals court ruled the Constitution limits the
president's power to make recess appointments to the period between sessions of Congress,
and only if that vacancy arises during that period.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta rejected similar arguments in 2004 by Democratic
Senator Ted Kennedy when it upheld President George W. Bush's recess pick of U.S.
Circuit Judge William Pryor. Therefore, before Canning, it was, at best, a dubious
proposition that the judiciary would nullify a presidential recess appointment. See Tom
Schoenberg, Obama Defeat on NLRB Picks a Rare Loss on Recess Power, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 28, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/obama-defeat-onnlrb-picks-a-rare-loss-on-recess-power.html.
185. See Alston, supra note 100, at 3 (noting that much of its standing analysis will be
rendered moot if Canning is reversed on appeal). The Government has 45 days to seek
rehearing en banc by the full DC Circuit. If it decides to appeal directly to the United States
Supreme Court, it will have 60 days to file its petition for writ of certiorari. See Regulatory
and Government Affairs Alert, Wilmer Hale, DC Circuit Invalidates Obama Recess
Appointments 1 (Jan. 25, 2013) (on file with author).
186. Id. at 4.
187. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Alston, supra
note 100, at 4.
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wide public significant which amount to generalized grievances,
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches. 188 These standing requirements present a lofty
hurdle for a plaintiff only subject to the Bureau's authority. In sum,
such a plaintiff is undoubtedly on a weaker footing than a plaintiff
89
directly injured by an agency enforcement action.'
V. CONCLUSION

What is abundantly clear from the Raines decision is that federal
courts will not listen to arguments brought by someone who only has an
ideological axe to grind.1 90 Courts tend to respect the direction of
Congress when it comes in the form of laws, not judicial
undertakings.' 9' While the Geithner case is likely to be dismissed for a
lack of standing, the Canning decision could spawn new lawsuits
brought by plaintiffs impacted by the increasing number of final
Despite the lack of Bureau
promulgations of the Bureau. 19 2
enforcement activity, plaintiffs aggrieved by such regulations are the
most likely to establish standing in federal court.
Irrespective of whether the Cordray appointment is invalidated,
Dodd-Frank empowers the Acting Secretary of the Treasury to ratify
certain actions of the Bureau when no director is in place.' 93 This
recourse along with the "de facto officer" doctrine provides a sense of
security for existing Bureau promulgations. 94 Moreover, the recess

188.

See supra pp. 22-24.

189. However, in light of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of standing in
Appointments Clause cases, it is certainly possible that such a party would be found to have
standing to challenge Mr. Cordray's appointment. Alston, supra note 100, at 4.
190. Lauren Saunders, Challengers to CFPBRecess Appointment Face Another Hurdle,
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/prcfpb-interim-authority.pdf.
191. Uncharted Territory, supra note 5, at 36 (statement of Rep. Darrell Issa, Cal.).
192. See Davis Polk, supra note 22, at 3.
193. See 12 U.S.C. § 5586 (Supp. IV 2010).
194. See Regulatory and Government Affairs Alert, Wilmer Hale, DC Circuit
Invalidates Obama Recess Appointments 1 (Jan. 25, 2013) (on file with author). The De
Facto Officer Doctrine is an equitable doctrine that courts invoke from time to time to
prevent chaos due to invalid appointments. Although the De Facto Officer Doctrine is by no
means automatic, and should only apply in extenuating circumstances, courts have some
leeway to ratify actions already taken by Cordray as Director. Morrison Foerster, supra note
182.
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appointment of Richard Cordray will expire at the end of the year. 95
Because courts move relatively slow, a judicial resolution is not likely
to develop until after the expiration of Cordray's term, deeming the
issue "water under the bridge." For these reasons, financial institutions
and consumers alike should plan on complying with the promulgations
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

S. AuSTIN KING

195. On January 24, 2012, President Obama re-nominated Richard Cordray as Director
of the Bureau. Congressional Republicans have again threatened to block the nomination
unless substantive changes are made to the Bureau. See Karen Weise, The Consumer
Watchdog Comes Under New Fire From Congress, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 4,
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-04/the-consumer-watchdog-comesunder-new-fire-from-congress.

